ALMATY—The August seizure of several villages in southern Kyrgyzstan, as well as the taking of hostages—including four Japanese geologists —by a group of armed Islamic militants came as a shock to many in Central Asia. Immediately afterward, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev issued a decree mobilizing reservists who had served in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The military immediately began to round up these young reservists—by some estimates nearly 2,000—sending them to the Batken region. Kyrgyzstan is essentially a peaceful country that runs at a very slow pace—and its military is in extremely poor condition. Most reservists have not undergone any training or practice since leaving mandatory service. Additionally, people were stunned that these events, taking place in a distant corner of Kyrgyzstan, were affecting their daily lives.

Kyrgyzstan is known as the most democratic country in the region. However, the politically stable but cash-strapped country of 4.6 million, with an underfunded and unprepared military, is ill-equipped to defend itself against determined radicals with a fundamentalist agenda—and the largely impoverished population might understandably flock to anyone making promises of improving their lives.

Even the government in neighboring Kazakhstan became nervous at the threat of fundamentalism, notifying its reserve officers to be prepared for call-up. Around 200 people suspected of Islamic fundamentalism were arrested in September and October in cities throughout Kyrgyzstan, though most have since been released.

The Kyrgyz foreign ministry called the attack an attempt by "international terrorists ... to force their ideological views upon the people of Kyrgyzstan." Kyrgyz media said the attack was Kyrgyzstan's most serious political crisis and threat to its sovereignty since becoming independent more than eight years ago.

Amid the confusion and uncertainty about the true goals of the rebels—whose numbers at various times have been estimated between 100 and 1,000—the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism is clearly not what they are after. The rebels conveniently label themselves fundamentalists in order to instill fear, thus making it easier to extort money. Many have turned to Kyrgyzstan because of its proximity to their home countries and because it is relatively easy to penetrate.

The rebels are believed to be mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks who earned their living fighting during the Tajik civil war. With the end of the war, those fighters, who do not belong to any particular political group, lost their purpose. Alma Sultangalieva, a leading expert on religion in Central Asia at the Almaty-based Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies, describes the phenomenon as "Kalashnikov culture," since fighting is the only skill they have. "As the situation in Tajikistan normalizes, these people have to do something to survive," she says. "Our borders are transparent, so they go to neighboring areas, such as Kyrgyzstan," which is mountainous and difficult to control.

ISLAM MAKES A COMEBACK

Since 1991, the newly independent Central Asian states have seen a revival of Islam and Muslim heritage, suppressed under Soviet rule. That is partially due to the need felt by some to rediscover their roots and cultural identity, but also because the demise of the Soviet Union has left many with a spiritual vacuum they now seek to fill. Unemployment and other economic and social problems experienced by post-Soviet countries have contributed to that phenomenon.

The leaders of the five newly independent states were quick to adopt Islamic traditions, which helped them create a feeling of national cohesion. The presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Saparmurat Niyazov and Islam Karimov, both former Communist Party chiefs, even made pilgrimages to Mecca.

The rediscovery of Islam has manifested itself in the construction and re-opening of thousands of mosques in Central Asia, the increasing availability of religious literature, and the occasional sight of a woman dressed in "Turkish" style, with headscarves and ankle-length dresses. Outside sources—such as the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other Islamic countries—have sent thousands of Korans and religious literature to Central Asia, arranged for regular student exchanges and the education of religious teachers, and made much-needed financial donations. Islamic countries, particularly Turkey, look on the Central Asian countries as their poor little brothers, and they are eager to help those states rediscover Islam—partly for ideological, but also practical, geopolitical reasons. Turkey has a special affinity for their newly independent brothers, who, with the exception of Tajikistan, all speak Turkic languages.

But the role of religion today varies from country to country and sometimes from region to region. In rural areas and in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, people tend to be more religious than those living in cities and in the north. Overall, there is a high level of religious diversity in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in Kazakhstan, both of which have a large European population that follow religions other than Islam. While Kyrgyz and Kazakhs were formerly nomadic people—where Islam never developed deep roots and women did not have to wear veils—the Uzbeks have always been settled and traditionally more religious. The beautiful Islamic architecture in the cities of Bukhara, Khiva, and Samarkand in Uzbekistan is testimony to the historic importance of religion.

In Kyrgyzstan, it has become fashionable to openly exhibit religious devotion. Mosques, however small, are being built in almost every village. They are often financed by businessmen or politicians, according to Ramazan Dyryldaev, chairman of the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights. "Some politicians are using religion to get votes," he says.

FEARING FUNDAMENTALISM

Even though the outward display of greater Muslim awareness is welcomed in Central Asia, authorities have increasingly been concerned about the potential rise of Islamic fundamentalism. As the political regimes in Central Asia have become more authoritarian and most of their presidents appear inclined to run their countries for life, any opposition is discouraged. The possibility that the newly built mosques and religious schools could develop into an alternative network for political activists that would undermine the state has led Central Asian leaders to associate Islam with fundamentalism. Consequently, the authorities frequently fail to make a distinction between devout Muslims, government opponents who are Muslims, and radical Islamists.

In fact, the greatest threat from Islamic fundamentalism comes from Tajikistan, the only country in Central Asia in which religious political parties are allowed and where fundamentalists are part of the government. Tajikistan is considered to be the least modernized of the five Central Asian countries and therefore more prone to fundamentalist tendencies. Unlike in other Central Asian countries, the modernization of Tajikistan during the Soviet period was very superficial. Many people there live in isolated villages and do not speak Russian proficiently. Given their isolationism -- as well as their strong Islamic traditions -- Tajiks are likely to be much more susceptible to radicalism, especially if offered money or spiritual support, anything that helps improve their lives. The Soviet conflict in Afghanistan brought Tajik military forces into contact with Afghan Muslims for the first time. Later, Tajik Muslims and oppositionists, who were fighting against the Tajik government, fled to Afghanistan and periodically organized raids into Tajikistan.

Though the last of the hostages was released on 26 October, Kyrgyz leaders have now been given ample reason to strengthen control over their countries. The militants not only made ransom demands -- some say they are also involved in the lucrative narcotics business and are seeking to establish a safe corridor for the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe via Central Asia. The transition from communism to a free market economy has turned out to be a far longer and complicated process than was anticipated at the time of independence. Privatization and the restructuring of industries, although necessary and beneficial in the long-term, have cost people jobs and robbed them of their identity or even place in society.

While the Kyrgyz population would probably not turn into Islamic radicals for religious reasons, widespread poverty, unemployment, and poor social conditions in all could lead people into the arms of fundamentalists, especially if given financial encouragement. The Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights has found that businessmen from Iran and Pakistan have given money to Kyrgyz people and provided them with religious education. "Give someone $100, and they will follow you," says Dyryldaev. "In the south, the terrorists have freely bought food and products from the people and have established good relationships with them."

In the course of a generation, Central Asia is likely to see a greater resurgence of religiousness, particularly in support of Islam. But Kyrgyzstan will have to find better ways of protecting its borders, if it does not want to be the victim of its own geography. The events in Batken have shown that Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors are ill-prepared to fend off any attacks against the sovereignty of their countries. Kyrgyzstan was compelled to ask Russia to provide military assistance -- a request made several months after Russian troops, who continued to guard the Kyrgyz-Chinese border after the breakup of the Soviet Union, had finally left the country.

Birgit Brauer is a journalist who writes about Central Asia for The Economist from Almaty. She is also a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom.

Transitions articles on religious issues in Uzbekistan:
Transitions focused on Central Asia in June 1997. Leading the package, David Rieff challenges the notion that Central Asian states necessarily aspire to Western-style democratic ideals.
Transitions revisited Central Asia in October 1998 with our theme, "Over a Barrel." The package discusses the influence of oil, the ambitions of the region's presidents, and the damaging legacy of Soviet nuclear waste.
Bruce Pannier's "Cracking Down on Wahhabis," from June 1998, discusses the problematic relations between divergent Islamic sects in the Ferghana valley.
In "The Feeble Breath of Democracy," from August 1998, Anthony Hyman broadly explores the nature of post-Soviet transition in Central Asia.