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Environnement
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hostil
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Corruption
depletes national wealth. Transparency
International says corruption is often to blame for
already limited public resources being diverted to
uneconomic high-profile projects, at the expense of
less spectacular but more necessary infrastructure
projects. "Corruption remains one of the greatest
obstacles to economic and social development," says
Helen Sutch, of the World Bank.
Read IPS special coverage Publications - Publications - Publicaciones
2010 Frontline/World : Spotlight: The Victims of Corruption,: The Business of Bribes: February 24, 2009 2009 OCDE : Lutte contre la corruption Global Witness: hacia la ruptura de los vínculos entre recursos naturales, conflicto y corrupción Albert Duvillard : ONG en eaux troubles, 30/07/2009 N°1924 Le Point (Révélations. Derrière les ONG et les bons sentiments affichés se cachent parfois des intérêts discutables....« Une décision historique », s'est targué Daniel Lebègue, le président de Transparency International-France, lorsque début mai Françoise Desset, doyenne des juges d'instruction du pôle financier de Paris, a jugé recevable la plainte de cette ONG (organisation non gouvernementale) visant trois chefs d'Etat africains (Omar Bongo, Gabon ; Sassou Nguesso, Congo ; Teodoro Obiang, Guinée équatoriale) pour « détournements de fonds publics ».) 2008 Ernst & Young : Corruption or compliance - weighing the costs: 10th global fuaud survey mai 2008 (Quelle perception les entreprises ont-elles de la corruption ? Les plus grandes entreprises internationales a répondu dans cette 10ème édition de l'enquête mondiale.) Transparency international : Rapport mondial sur la corruption 2008, Résumé exécutif Corruption Perceptions Index 2008 OCDE : Corruption Glossaire des normes pénales internationales 2007 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 Elizabeth Kelleher : Des organismes d'aide à l'étranger attirent l'attention sur la corruption (Admettre l'existence des problèmes est une chose honorable.) Washington File, 19 août 2006 Eric Chol : Wolfowitz lave plus blanc, L'Express du 25/05/2006 ( Les attaques frontales du patron américain de la Banque mondiale contre la corruption lui permettent de jouer les justiciers) Mbembe, Achille Les pervers du village : Sexualité, vénalité et déréliction en postcolonie, multitudes.samizdat.net, 13 mai 2006 (L’économie politique de la corruption dans les sociétés postcoloniales d’Afrique est, sinon relativement bien connue, du moins facile à déchiffrer. Ce qui l’est moins, c’est son « économie morale », c’est-à-dire, en dernier ressort, ses fonctions libidinales - celles qui sont liées aux rapports complexes entre désir, mort et génitalité. C’est la prévalence de ces fonctions libidinales dans les formes africaines de corruption qui différencie celles-ci, disons, des figures asiatiques du même fléau. ) Sylvain Cypel : Comment Paris a perdu les JO 2012, LE MONDE 19.04.06 Banque mondiale : Gouvernance et lutte anti-corruption World bank : Governance and Anti-Corruption
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 Babette Stern : De l'Irak d'après guerre à l'Asie post-tsunami, la corruption prospère dans les pays en reconstruction, Le Monde 17.03.05 (Le rapport de Transparency International, publié mercredi 16 mars, évalue à 300 milliards de dollars les pots-de-vin versés à l'occasion de contrats de construction dans le monde.)
Le Monde : Des hommes dans la tourmente du scandale "Pétrole contre nourriture", Thématique publiée le 12.05.05 (En 1996, le programme de l'ONU "Pétrole contre nourriture" entre en vigueur pour s'achever en novembre 2003. Des allégations de corruption liées à ce programme décident, en avril 2004, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies à voter la création d'une commission d'enquête. Les premières conclusions intermédiaires de la commission Volcker, du nom de son directeur, plongent des personnalités importantes dans la tourmente du désormais célèbre scandale "Pétrole contre nourriture".) USAID Anticorruption Strategy, january 2005 International Chamber of Commerce (Commission on Anti-Corruption) : Combating Extortion and Bribery: ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations, 2005 edition La
ratification hier par l'Équateur de la
Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption a
enclenché le processus à l'issue
duquel, dans 90 jours, soit le 14 décembre
2005, ce texte entrera en vigueur, indique l'Office
des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime.
« La Convention est le premier instrument
mondial destiné à aider les
États membres à combattre la
corruption, dans les secteurs public et
privé. Le mécanisme prévu dans
la Convention qui permet aux États de
récupérer les milliards de fonds
détournés est une première
dans ce domaine », indique un communiqué
de presse
de l'ONU publié à New
York. «
Moins de deux ans après l'adoption, en
décembre 2003, de la Convention contre la
corruption, et grâce aux efforts de l'Office
des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime
(ONUDC),
le processus d'entrée en vigueur peut
commencer », ajoute le communiqué.
« Le mécanisme de recouvrement des
fonds est, selon Antonio Maria Costa, directeur de
l'ONUDC, prometteur pour les pays dont la
trésorerie a été pillée
par des fonctionnaires corrompus ». « La
Convention offre aux pays africains les outils
juridiques nécessaires pour transformer
leurs économies et fournit aux États
membres les principes directeurs utiles pour
l'élaboration d'une législation
cohérente de lutte contre la corruption
», rappelle l'ONUDC. « La Convention
appelle également à une plus grande
coopération entre les États et
à une aide réciproque,
particulièrement dans le domaine du
blanchiment de l'argent. En ce qui concerne la
prévention, il est prévu que les
États demandent à la
société civile de s'impliquer dans
les campagnes de lutte contre la corruption »,
ajoute-t-elle. Le
9 septembre dernier, Antonio Maria Costa a
rappelé en référence aux
« blocages souvent posés par certains
pays », que la convention contre la
corruption, qui devrait entrer la semaine prochaine
en vigueur, stipulait que le secret bancaire ne
peut plus être invoqué pour refuser de
répondre aux enquêtes sur le
détournement des fonds déposés
dans des pays tiers (voir notre dépêche
du 9 septembre 2005). 2004 Indice
de perceptions de la corruption
2004 La
corruption sévit dans 60 pays et constitue
un véritable fléau dans le secteur
public, indique TI. L'Indice de perceptions de la
corruption 2004 de Transparency International
classe un nombre record de 146 pays ; la plupart
des pays producteurs de pétrole connaissent
généralement un niveau de corruption
élevé. Londres, le 20 octobre
2004 Corruption
Perceptions Index 2004 Corruption
is rampant in 60 countries, and the public sector
is plagued by bribery, says TI. Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
2004 ranks a record 146 countries; most
oil-producing nations are prone to high corruption.
London, 20 October 2004 Indice
de Percepción de Corrupción
2004 La
Corrupción es endémica en 60
países y la administración
pública está plagada de sobornos,
dice TI. El Índice de Percepción de
la Corrupción 2004 de Transparency
International clasifica un número
récord de 146 países; la
mayoría de las naciones productoras de
petróleo son más propensas a mayores
niveles de corrupción. Londres, 20 de
octubre de 2004
The Global Corruption Report 2004 includes reports on: * the regulation of political finance worldwide * the disclosure of money flows in politics * the enforcement of political finance laws * the practice of vote buying * the role of the private sector, with a special focus on the arms and oil sectors * efforts to repatriate wealth looted by politicians
Edward Helmore : Eliot Spitzer : Untouchable on the prowl in New York Guardian Weekly, The Observer, Sunday November 07 2004 Libération.fr : Le CIO accusé de corruption, 04 août 2004 (Des «agents» qui promettent, moyennant finances, de rallier les voix de dizaines de membres du CIO à la cause des villes candidates à l'organisation des Jeux 2012: c'est le sujet d'un reportage diffusé mercredi soir par la BBC) "Only
gifts of nominal value, in accordance with
prevailing local customs, may be given or accepted
by the Olympic parties, as a mark of respect or
friendship. Any other gift must be passed on to the
organisation of which the beneficiary is a member."
"They
(the Olympic parties) must not act in a manner
likely to tarnish the reputation of the Olympic
movement." "The
Olympic parties must not be involved with firms or
persons whose activity is inconsistent with the
principles set out in the Olympic Charter."
"The
Olympic parties shall neither give nor accept
instructions to vote or intervene in a given manner
within the organs of the IOC." Ernst
Welteke resigned as chairman of the Bundesbank in
the face of controversy over a euro7,661 ($9,200)
hotel bill paid by Dresdner Bank during the launch
of the euro in 2002. In a resignation letter he
blasted Germany's government for interfering with
the bank's independence by pressuring him to go.
Axel Weber, a top academic, will take over.
Royal
Dutch/Shell published a damning independent report
into the overstatement of its oil and gas reserves.
The oil giant placed the blame firmly on its former
chairman, Sir Philip Watts, and another top
executive, Walter van de Vijver, for misleading
shareholders. Judy Boynton, Shell's finance chief,
became the latest boardroom casualty. Sanjay
Kumar, chairman and chief executive of Computer
Associates, stepped down after a review by the
software company's audit committee into the firm's
past accounting practices. However, Mr Kumar will
remain at Computer Associates in the newly created
position of chief software architect. Nine people
were also sacked as a result of an ongoing federal
probe of the firm. Darleen
Druyun, a former American air force employee,
pleaded guilty to charges that she conspired to
award a military-tanker contract to Boeing. She
admitted discussing a job offer from Boeing while
still employed as a procurement official. The
contract is suspended while a review is under way.
Mark
Whiston stepped down as CEO of Janus Capital, one
of the first mutual funds to be investigated for
improper trading by Eliot Spitzer, New York state's
attorney-general. Janus is close to reaching a
settlement with regulators over its part in the
scandal. Found
in The Economist, Apr 22nd 2004 al-Mada (Bagdad) : The Saddam Oil Bribes: The Complete al-Mada List January 25, 2004 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 Associated Press : Les principales dates de l'affaire Elf. 2003-11-12 Marc Roche : Parmalat, comme tant d'autres... Le Monde 13.01.04 La faillite du géant de l'agroalimentaire italien met la communauté financière internationale devant ses faiblesses. The Economist : Public office and private interest : The suits inside the battledress. Is collusion between government and big business increasing in America? Apr 17th 2003 2002 Anthony Stoddard : World: Corporate Bribery on the Rise, Says Survey, Inter Press Service, May 15, 2002 The Economist : The short arm of the law. Plenty of laws exist to ban bribery by companies. But big multinationals continue to sidestep them with ease. Feb 28th 2002 Indice
de Perceptions de la Corruption 2002
Elites
politiques corrompues et investisseurs sans
scrupule portent un coup mortel au
développement durable, annonce Transparency
International. « Les élites politiques
et leurs acolytes continuent de toucher des
pots-de-vin chaque fois que l'occasion se
présente », a déclaré
Peter Eigen, Président de Transparency
International (TI) « Main dans la main avec
des milieux d'affaires corrompus, ils
enchaînent des nations entières dans
la pauvreté, freinant ainsi leur
développement durable. La corruption est
extrêmement élevée dans les
régions pauvres du monde mais
également dans beaucoup de pays dont les
sociétés investissent dans les pays
en voie de développement », a-t-il
ajouté. Corruption
Perceptions Index 2002 Corrupt
political elites and unscrupulous investors kill
sustainable growth in its tracks, highlights new
index. "Political elites and their cronies continue
to take kickbacks at every opportunity. Hand in
glove with corrupt business people, they are
trapping whole nations in poverty and hampering
sustainable development. Corruption is perceived to
be dangerously high in poor parts of the world, but
also in many countries whose firms invest in
developing nations," said Peter Eigen, Chairman of
Transparency International. Indice
de Percepción de Corrupción
2002 Las
élites políticas corruptas y los
inversionistas inescrupulosos paralizan el
crecimiento sostenible, destaca el nuevo
índice. "Las élites políticas
y sus camaradas continúan aceptando sobornos
a la menor oportunidad. Junto con empresarios
corruptos, están atrapando a naciones
enteras en la pobreza y obstaculizando el
desarrollo sostenible. Se perciben niveles
peligrosamente altos de corrupción en
lugares pobres del mundo, y también en
muchos países cuyas empresas invierten en
naciones en vías de desarrollo,"
manifestó Peter Eigen, Presidente de
Transparency International. 2001
Nicolas Cori : La peur du scandale en France et en Allemagne. Les deux pays cherchent à renforcer l'indépendance des analystes. Libération, 13 août 2001 Ignacio Ramonet : Présidents traqués, Le Monde diplomatique, août 2001 The Net as Corruption Disruption by Julia Scheeres March 26, 2001 PST Indice
de Perceptions de la Corruption 2002
Elites
politiques corrompues et investisseurs sans
scrupule portent un coup mortel au
développement durable, annonce Transparency
International. « Les élites politiques
et leurs acolytes continuent de toucher des
pots-de-vin chaque fois que l'occasion se
présente », a déclaré
Peter Eigen, Président de Transparency
International (TI) « Main dans la main avec
des milieux d'affaires corrompus, ils
enchaînent des nations entières dans
la pauvreté, freinant ainsi leur
développement durable. La corruption est
extrêmement élevée dans les
régions pauvres du monde mais
également dans beaucoup de pays dont les
sociétés investissent dans les pays
en voie de développement », a-t-il
ajouté. Corruption
Perceptions Index 2002 Corrupt
political elites and unscrupulous investors kill
sustainable growth in its tracks, highlights new
index. "Political elites and their cronies continue
to take kickbacks at every opportunity. Hand in
glove with corrupt business people, they are
trapping whole nations in poverty and hampering
sustainable development. Corruption is perceived to
be dangerously high in poor parts of the world, but
also in many countries whose firms invest in
developing nations," said Peter Eigen, Chairman of
Transparency International. Indice
de Percepción de Corrupción
2002 Las
élites políticas corruptas y los
inversionistas inescrupulosos paralizan el
crecimiento sostenible, destaca el nuevo
índice. "Las élites políticas
y sus camaradas continúan aceptando sobornos
a la menor oportunidad. Junto con empresarios
corruptos, están atrapando a naciones
enteras en la pobreza y obstaculizando el
desarrollo sostenible. Se perciben niveles
peligrosamente altos de corrupción en
lugares pobres del mundo, y también en
muchos países cuyas empresas invierten en
naciones en vías de desarrollo,"
manifestó Peter Eigen, Presidente de
Transparency International. 2001 Indice
de Perceptions
de la Corruption 2001 "On ne voit
pas de fin à l'abus de pouvoir dans les
services publics et les niveaux de corruption sont
perçus comme plus haut que jamais, tant dans
les pays développés que dans le monde
en développement" déclare Peter
Eigen, Président de Transparency
International, s'exprimant aujourd'hui sur la
parution de l'Indice de Perception de la Corruption
2001. "La corruption a atteint un niveau critique
à l'échelle mondiale. C'est le
message sans équivoque de l'Indice de
Perceptions de la Corruption 2001 (IPC), qui
reflète le degré de corruption
ressenti comme existant dans les services publics
et la classe politique. Les pays obtenant un score
inférieur à 5 sur une note maximum de
10 se retrouvent sur tous les continents" a-t-il
ajouté lors de la publication de l'IPC par
Transparency International (TI) ce jour.
The
2001 Corruption Perceptions
Index "There
is no end in sight to the misuse of power by those
in public office - and corruption levels are
perceived to be as high as ever in both the
developed and developing worlds," said Peter Eigen,
Chairman of Transparency International, speaking
today on the launch of the Corruption Perceptions
Index 2001. "There is a worldwide corruption
crisis. That is the clear message from the year
2001 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which
reflects the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist among public officials and
politicians. Scores of less than 5 out of a clean
score of 10 are registered by countries on every
continent," he said on the publication today of the
CPI by Transparency International (TI). Indice
de Percepción de la Corrupción del
año 2001 "No
se percibe aún un punto final al abuso de
poder por parte de los funcionarios públicos
- y nunca antes los niveles de corrupción
percibidos habían sido tan altos tanto en
los países desarrollados como en los que se
encuentran en vías de desarrollo," dijo
Peter Eigen, Presidente de Transparency
International, con motivo del lanzamiento efectuado
hoy del Indice de Percepción de la
Corrupción del año 2001. "Hay una
crisis de corrupción a nivel mundial. Este
es el claro mensaje que nos deja el Indice de
Percepción de la Corrupción del
año 2001 (IPC), el cual refleja el grado en
que es percibida la corrupción entre
funcionarios públicos y políticos. En
países de todos los continentes se
registraron puntajes inferiores a 5 sobre una
puntuación máxima posible de 10-
incluyendo miembros de la Organización de
Estados Americanos y de la Unión Europea,"
dijo el doctor Eigen hoy durante la
publicación del IPC por parte de
Transparency International (TI). 2000 La Convention interaméricaine contre la corruption, Gouvernement du canada, Sommet des Amériques Gérard Verna et Jean-Claude Usunier : La Corrupción: Compromisos nacionales y conexiones internacionales, Probidad (San Salvador) Edición No. 11, nov. 2000 Amnesty International Corruption Reports september 2000 Amnesty International Corruption Reports june 2000 Alexandre Adler : Kohl, ou le syndrome de la guerre froide, Courrier international, 12 janvier 2000 John Bray, Control Risks Group : Beyond Compliance: Corruption as a Business Risk 2000
1999 Amnesty International Corruption Reports june 1999 Daniel Dommel : Les défis de la corruption, TI Working Paper, 12 janvier 1999 Díaz Dionis, Gregorio La economía del delito al servicio de la política. (1999) - Artículo originalmente publicado en la revista española "Razón y Fe" en el año 1993. 1998 Usia : la corruption, obstacle au développement Perspectives économiques, volume 3, numéro 5, novembre 1998 Therry Fabre - Chasseurs de corruption : Portraits des pionniers de la lutte anti pots-de-vin L'expansion 5 juillet 1998 Robert Klitgaard :International Cooperation Against Corruption Finance & Development, March 1998, Volume 35, Number 1 Paolo Mauro : Corruption : Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research (Finance & Development, march 1998) Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann : Corruption and Development (Finance & Development, march 1998) Wallace, J. Clifford.. "Resolving Judicial Corruption while Preserving Judicial Independence: Comparative Perspectives." California Western International Law Journal 28, 2 (Spring 1998): 341-351. (This paper analyzes the issues around combating corruption in the judiciary using evidence from Asia and the United States. It addresses specifically the tension implicit in the requirement that a judiciary be at once independent and accountable. The essay concludes that while accountability is crucial, judicial oversight must remain in the judiciary to avoid political investigations and removal of judges.) Geoff Davidian, l'Albert Londres du Web, New-York Times via Courrier international, 1998 Center forInternational Private Enterprise 1998 Nancy Zucker Boswell : New Tools to Fight Corruption Control Risks Group and the Industrial Research Bureau : International Corruption: The Business Respons, 1998 1997 Klitgaard, Robert. "'Unanticipated Consequences' in Anti-Poverty Programs." World Development 25, 12 (December 1997 ): 1963-1972. (Unanticipated effects of anti-poverty programs conducted by multilateral donors. The unexpected effects may include a variety of distortions, including increased corruption. When an official acquires discretionary power over a good or service, corruption may result as a consequence of diminished accountability.) Bliss, Christopher and Rafael Di Tella.. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?" Journal of Political Economy 105, 51 (October 1997 ): 1001-1023. (Useful for staff who want to understand the relationship between corruption and competition. Explanation of under what circumstances competition may limit the costs of corruption.) Bardhan, Pranab.. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." Journal of Economic Literature 35 (Sept 1997 ): 1320-1346. (Review of the literature on corruption with five general issues: corruption and efficiency, corruption and growth, national differences in corruption, policy issues in reducing corruption, and incentives for reducing corruption) Mény, Yves. "'Fin de Siècle' Corruption: Change, Crisis and Shifting Values." International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies 149 (September 1997 ): 309-320. (Shifting values have elevated corruption as a critical problem for government. Perceptions of the costs of corruption hold that it has increased and an urgency has become apparent to control its incidence. Corruption reflects a crisis in the efficient functioning of the public sector and has become a priority for governments to control. Task managers and staff may find this a useful article to think about corruption conceptually and how it affects public sector efficiency.) Kaufmann, Daniel.. "Corruption: the Facts." Foreign Policy 107 (Summer 1997 ): 114-131. (This paper explains the costs of corruption to a government. The paper rejects arguments that corruption "greases" development, that reforms breed bribery, and the notion that corruption cannot be controlled. Reducing venal behavior requires the involvement of civil society and a mix of programs including liberalization, deregulation, and tax, budget, institutional, civil service, and legal reforms.) Wedeman, Andrew.. "Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend-Collectors: The Political Economy of Corruption in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines." The Journal of Developing Areas 31, 4 (Summer 1997): 457-478. (This article explains different patterns of corruption : looting, scraping, and rent-collection) The Economist : Can government reduce corruption by paying more to public servants? Reasons to be venal August 16th 1997 Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella... "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic." The Economic Journal 107 (July 1997 ): 1023-1042. (Interventionist industrial policies to promote investment and research and development encourage corruption. Consequently, benefits from such investments are diminished by the corrupt practices.) Cartier-Bresson, Jean. 1997. "Corruption Networks, Transaction Security and illegal Social Exchange." Political Studies (65): 463-476. (Most studies of corruption concentrate on occasional and unorganized behavior. analyze of instead networks of corrupt actors who interact in regular, organized corruption. The study of networks has more to offer for an understanding of corruption than the classic political economy approach.) Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, eds.. 1997 (Fourth edition). Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. (compilation of 56 of the classic studies of corruption drawn from academic journals and books.) Johnston, Michael. 1997 Political Corruption and Public Policy in America. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. (This book provides a number of useful definitions of corruption and explores how they relate to policy in the United States.) Mauro, Paolo. 1997. "Why Worry About Corruption?" Economic Issues 6. Washington: IMF. (This paper lists various causes of corruption including trade restrictions, subsidies, price controls, low civil service salaries, natural resource endowments, and sociological factors. The consequences include lower investment rates, loss of tax revenues, poor aid flows, and distortions in government expenditure and capacity to deliver services. It concludes that corruption negatively affects investment and growth.)
Kimberly Ann Elliott (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 1997 Glynn, Patrick, Stephen J. Kobrin, and Moisés Naím. 1997. "The Globalization of Corruption." 7-27. (An international backlash against corruption has been manifest in the outcry among governments and international non-governmental organizations. The effort to extend the FCPA internationally is evidence of this globalization of intolerance.)
1996 Leiken, Robert S. 1996-1997. "Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic." Foreign Policy 105 (Winter): 55-73 (An explosion in the incidence of corruption has occurred worldwide fot two reasons: the Cold War's end led to higher disclosures of malfeasance and the spread of democracy.) Chossudovsky, Michel.. "Comment les mafias gangrènent l'économie mondiale." Le Monde Diplomatique (Décembre 1996 ): 24-25. Das Gupta, Arindam and Dilip Mookherjee. "Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12, 2 (October 1996 ): 408-431. (Tax amnesties increase government revenues and diminish the overall size of a country's informal sector earnings.) Johnston, Michael. "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption." International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies 149 (September 1996): 321-336. (The multiple problems that confront efforts to define corruption in a meaningful fashion. Useful for understand the complexity of defining corrupt behavior.) Informe de la Revista internacional de ciencias sociales : La corrupción en las democrácias occidentales No 149 Septiembre 1996 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption." International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies 149 (September 1996): 365-380. (Corruption scandals are a sign that a people differentiate between the public and private realms of finance. Whereas in a democracy, the consumption of public revenues constitutes a corruption scandal, such a distinction is impossible in an autocracy in which the ruler has ownership over the state. The article concludes that democracy may limit corruption as politicians may fear losing office as a consequence of involvement in scandals.) Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996. ): Cheung, Steven N.S. A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption." 1-5. (Focusing on transition economies, the article assumes that all government officials are self-maximizers who are receptive to opportunities for corruption. The article concludes that introducing competition into transition economies will reduce opportunities for corruption.) DS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption 27, 2 (April 1996 ) Harriss-White, Barbara and Gordon White. "Corruption, Liberalization, and Democracy." : 1-6. (Emergence of a new corruption of rapacious elites who engage in criminal behavior free from constraints of cold war patrons.) Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "The Political Economy of Corruption - Causes and Consequences." Viewpoint 74 (April 1996). (Corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors. bribes are paid to get government benefits or avoid costs. A resulting lack of efficiency imposes general costs. corruption is an impediment to growth and long-term economic performance.) Tirole, Jean. 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)." The Review of Economic Studies (63): 1-22. (Collective reputations are composites of individual reputations and may be modeled as such. a) the reputations of a group's members determine collective reputations; b) collective reputations build on imperfect past observations; c) past practices structure current behavior; d) new members mimic a group's elders. individual reputation stems from collective reputations that are based on past behaviors.) 1995 Tanzi, Vito. "Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets." Finance and Development (December 1995): 24-26. (An argument that special measures must be taken for situations where existing moral and social codes require that one help family and friends. Civil servants will then be expected to help their relations at significant cost to the government. Recommends a forced, periodic reassignment of civil servants to prevent favoritism to family members and friends.) Mauro, Paolo.. "Corruption and Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 2 (August 1995 ): 681-711. (corruption, red tape, an inefficient judiciary and political instability lower investment and economic growth. reducing corruption and bureaucratic impediments has a direct impact on investment and economic growth.) Mookherjee, Dilip and I.P.L. Png.. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?" The Economic Journal 105 (January 1995 ): 145-156. (any delegation of authority creates opportunities for corruption. the authors explore the relationship between sanction and opportunity. only large increases in penalty will effectively diminish corruption.) Morice, Alain. "Corruption, loi et société: Quelques propositions." Revue tiers monde 36, 141 (Mars 1995 ): 41-65 Alam, M.S.. 1995. "A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications." Kyklos 48, (3): 419-435. (why does corruption vary across government agencies in the same state, and sometimes, even within the same agency ? Based on evidence from South Asia, the author concludes that corruption is a contest between two parties. Variation among and within governments depends on political, economic, legal, and cultural factors in a given country.) 1994
Le petit monde des travaux publics 1993 Schleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishney. "Corruption." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 3 (August 1993): 599-617. (consequences of corruption for resource allocation. political structures and processes determine the extent of corruption in a given country. Unlike its sibling taxation, corruption is costly and therefore detrimental to a country's economic development. corruption is an activity that occurs under conditions of secrecy.) Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny. "Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth." The American Economic Review 83, 2 (May 1993): 409-414. (rent-seeking is harmful to growth for two reasons. 1. rent-seeking tends naturally to have increasing returns. The effect is that high levels of rent-seeking are self-sustaining. 2. public rent-seeking is particularly harmful to innovation. innovation is a key element in economic growth and rent-seeking is therefore costly to growth.) Johnston, Michael. 1993. "'Micro' and 'Macro' Possibilities for Reform." Corruption and Reform 7, (3): 189-204. (democratic transitions revitalize civil society, which in turn, imposes greater accountability on a government by demanding less corruption. improved public sector management is essential if a government wishes to reduce corruption.) Kurer, Oskar. 1993. "Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources." Public Choice 77, (2): 259-273. (The revisionist approach -- notably Leff, Nye, and others --argues that corruption enhances market efficiency. The author argues convincingly that the revisionist approach is misleading and that corruption carries high costs, especially for developing economies. ) 1992 Tirole, Jean. "Persistence of Corruption." Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper 152 (October 1992). (corruption persists over time as a consequence of historical patterns. corruption ratchets up or down according to opportunities for collusion between bribers and bribe-takers.) Busch, Gary K. 1992. "Crime and Corruption: One View of a Parallel System." Mimeo, Transparency International. (The internationalization of corruption and crime in four fields: fraud in construction, maritime fraud, money laundering, and 'parlour-room crime' (fake antiquities, art, etc.)) 1991 Gillespie, Kate and Gwenn Okruhlik. "The Political Dimensions of Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis." Comparative Politics (October 1991 ): 77-95. (conceptual framework to analyze anti-corruption campaigns within governments and across states. The political variables involved in anti-corruption campaigns - useful for understanding the politics of reducing official venality. ) Campos, Jose Edgardo L. "The 'Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society' Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability and Development." Paper prepared for presentation at the World Bank, 1991. September 27. (This paper distinguishes between competitive rent-seeking and cronyism. cronyism leads to a capture of monopolies by a favored elite, which contributes to political instability. an excellent analysis of the political-economy of cronyism, an economically expensive form of rent-seeking found in many developing countries.) 1990 Alam, M.S.. "Some Economic Costs of Corruption." The Journal of Development Studies 27, 1 (October 1990 ): 89-97. (bribery cannot improve a country's economic efficiency through the creation of auction-like conditions. the patrimonial character of the LDCs restricts access to bribery and reduces the possibilities of detection.) Andvig, Jens Chr. And Karl Ove Moene. 1990. "How Corruption may Corrupt." The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (13): 63-76. (The same socioeconomic structures can result in different levels of corruption. a model showing that multiple equilibria may emerge in similar circumstances. It may be useful for task managers to understand variable levels of corruption in different countries.) 1987 Cadot, Olivier. "Corruption as a Gamble." Journal of Public Economics 33, 2 (July 1987 ): 223-244. (a model of corruption using a game in which players include a government official, a license, and an individual submitting a request. corruption may operate at multiple equilibria.) 1983 Gould, David J. and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes. 1983. "The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 580. Washington: The World Bank. (conditions in the developing world make corruption a strong problem. rapid socio-economic change, strong kinship and ethnic ties, and new institutions combined with political softness, widespread inequalities, and a state lacking legitimacy are conducive to corruption. ) 1982 Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities. Journal of Political Economy 90 (5): 988-1002. (This paper provides a taxonomy of DUP activities. These activities include the use of funds for lobbying for protection, market share, licenses, and monopolistic barriers to market. The basic characteristic is that DUP activities use funds to for rent-seeking and bribery with an aim of making a profit.) 1978 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1978. The Political Economy of Corruption. New York: Academic Press. (This is a seminal book on the political economy of corruption. Presents the idea that corruption exists at the interface of public and private sectors. The central argument is that corruption cannot be entirely eliminated, the cost of doing so would be excessively high. However, corruption may be reduced to a level that controls its costs and does not harm an economy. It is a statement that has influenced a significant number of subsequent studies on corruption and is therefore critical for anyone who wishes to understand the subject in any depth.) 1974 Krueger, Anne O.. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." The American Economic Review 64, 3 (June 1974 ): 291-303. (This seminal article introduces the concept of rents that are present in government monopolies. Competitive rent-seeking is a factor in societies where governments control sectors of the economy. The articles analyzes the opportunities created through state-owned enterprises, quantitative restrictions, and tariffs that lead to rent-seeking. ) 1968 Becker, Gary S.. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." The Journal of Political Economy 76, 2 (March-April 1968 ): 169-217. (This classic article analyzes the relationship between punishment and an individual's willingness to engage in an illegal act. It asks what is the optimal level of punishment to deter crime. The optimal level of punishment is largely a function of the cost of enforcement, investigation, and punishment. It concludes that the optimal levels of sanction depends upon the overall cost of enforcement. )
Dossiers, études et sites spécialisés - Files, Studies & Specialized Sites - Informes, estudios y sitios especializados
Global Witness campaigns to achieve real change by challenging established thinking on seemingly intractable global issues. We work to highlight the link between the exploitation of natural resources and human rights abuses, particularly where the resources such as timber, diamonds and oil are used to fund and perpetuate conflict and corruption. UNDP : Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries US Department of States : Fighting against Bribery and Corruption : A Multinational Effort OECD Anti-Corruption Unit : Combating Bribery and Corruption in International Business Transactions OCDE : La lutte contre la corruption Transparency International is a not-for-profit, non-governmental organisation, to counter corruption both in international business transactions and, through our National Chapters, at national levels. The World Bank Group : The Anti-Corruption Knowledge Center The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank : Governance and Anti-corruption La corruption de certains dirigeants du Tiers-Monde, Dossier Transnationale Centro de criminologia : Corrupcion Recueil d'articles du Monde diplomatique sur l'affairisme Roy Davies : Political Corruption. A Collection of Links on politics and political corruption in relation to financial scandals. Center for Research on Economic Fluctuations and Employment (CREFE) of the University of Quebec at Montreal: Working papers about Corruption The Independent Commission Against Corruption of New South Wales has compiled a very useful bibliography on corruption and related issues. Roy Davies : Political Corruption : A Collection of Links on politics and political corruption in relation to financial scandals. (permanent update) Focus on Chiquita Banana : Council On Hemispheric Affairs
FAIR USE NOTICE. (USINFO) This site contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. I am making this material available in my efforts to allow better education and advance understanding of human rights, economic democracy and social justice issues. I believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. r. |
La
liste noire de la Banque mondiale : Les
scandales Enron, WorldCom (Etats-Unis) et Parmalat
(Italie) ont conduit la Banque mondiale à
être particulièrement vigilante dans
l'attribution des contrats liés aux projets
qu'elle finance. En 2001, elle a créé
un département d'éthique qui traque
la mauvaise conduite de ses agents ou les pratiques
corrompues de ses consultants ou des entreprises
avec lesquelles elle travaille. Un budget de 10
millions de dollars par an est alloué
à cette instance. Un numéro vert
(1-800-831-04-63) a été ouvert
vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre pour signaler
les cas suspects. Depuis 2001, le
département a examiné 1 300 cas de
corruption et en instruit actuellement 300. A ce
jour, 282 entreprises ou consultants ont
été exclus de la liste des
contractants, dont 14 albanais, 2 français,
32 britanniques, 7 américains et 152
indonésiens. Dans son dernier rapport, paru
en février 2005, la liste s'allonge à
110 autres entreprises indonésiennes. Le
département d'éthique signale qu'une
entreprise française, Schlumberger, a
reçu une "mise en garde" en juillet 2003
mais reste éligible aux appels d'offres. Le
Monde 17.03.05
La
convention des nations unies contre la corruption
entrera en vigueur grâce aux ratifications en
marge du sommet (ONU, New York, Sep 16
2005)
Transparency
International 
La
police a ouvert une enquête criminelle sur le scandale
financier touchant la société chinoise China
Aviation Oil. La CAO, qui négocie les achats de
kérozène pour la plupart des compagnies
aériennes chinoises, a révélé
cette semaine avoir perdu 550 millions de dollars en
spéculant sur les cours du pétrole. Ces
pertes, supérieures à sa capitalisation
boursière, pourraient provoquer sa faillite. Selon la
presse locale, la maison-mère de CAO, une
société publique chinoise, avait connaissance
des pertes de sa filiale. Singapour redoute de voir son
image ternie par une faillite aussi fracassante que celle de
la 
A
week as usual....
Transparency
International 
Transparency
International 
Gérard
Verna et Jean-Claude Usunier : La grande triche (La
Découverte, 1994)
Forum